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Summary
Posner and Tullock have offered theoretical reasons for considering the
deadweight loss in consumers' and producers' surplus an understatement of the
social costs of monopoly. They suggest that competition for rent incurs addi-
tional inefficiencies which should also be reckoned as social costs. This
paper takes issue with that conclusion and offers a more general theory of the
social costs of monopoly. A crucial distinction is drawn between monopoly
rights which are guaranteed and enforced by government and those which are not.
In the absence of government-guaranteed monopoly rights, competition for rent
is shown to be efficient in inducing cost-saving innovation and invention, with
consequent social benefits. A model is developed for the alternative situation
in which there is competition for a government-guaranteed monopoly right. We
find that the greater the differences among the competitors in the productivity
of resources expended on securing the monopoly, the smaller will be the social
cost of monopoly over and above the deadweight loss.
.

Until the articles by Tullock (1967) and Posner (1975), the theo-
retical issue of the damage done by monopoly was not controversial.
Tullock proposed and Posner later refined a revision of our notions
about monopoly. The thrust of the theoretical point was that the part
of consumers' and producers' surplus labeled deadweight loss greatly
understated the welfare loss due to monopoly. That part of the reduction
in consumers' surplus previously dismissed as being simply an income
transfer to the monopolist was held to be an upper-bound on the social
costs of resources inefficiently attracted into the monopolized industry.
This new view has powerful implications. For example, if monopoly's
costs are far larger than we have heretofore thought, then perhaps the
budget of the Antitrust Division and of the FTC should be increased and
the fines and other punishments assessed for violating the antitrust
statutes should be raised. Cowling and Mueller (1978) estimate the
economy-wide monopoly welfare loss at up to 13% using the Posner-
Tullock framework and seem to call for precisely this type of
solution.
We find the Posner-Tullock reformulation to be potentially helpful
but as yet incomplete. The model fails to distinguish forcefully enough
between monopoly rights which are guaranteed and enforced by the state
and those which are not. Once this crucial distinction is re-introduced
a more general theory of the social costs of monopoly can be developed.
In what follows we first show that the failure to distinguish be-
tween the different sorts of monopoly leads to some curious policy
recommendations. For example, if all competition for rent involves a
social cost, the state should prohibit such competition by creating
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and enforcing monopolistic property rights for firms which have achieved
market shares of, say, 75%. This prescription is, however, precisely
the wrong one if it is the case, as we shall show, that only state-
enforced monopoly is capable of creating a social cost greater than the
traditional deadweight loss.
We next discuss the competition for monopoly rents which are not
government-guaranteed. We elaborate on a model developed by Williamson
and McGee to argue that this competition usually has important social
benefits. In this situation the deadweight loss overstates the social
cost of monopoly.
For the case where government does explicitly control the market,
we develop a model of the expected return to securing a monopoly and
show that the traditional deadweight loss is much closer to the correct
social cost of monopoly than is the sum of the deadweight loss and
the income transfer to the monopolist. It will be seen that Posner's
and Tullock's contention can be construed as a special case of this one
part of the more general model.
II. Some Implications of the New Social Cost Theory
In this section we examine some logical implications of treating
the income transfer to the monopolist as a social cost. It will be
shown that each of these implications clashes with our understanding
of competitive efficiency.
As a first case, imagine an industry which has two firms competing
for market dominance. Each firm is making large expenditures on changing
technologies and advertising, and after a time one firm emerges with a
dominant, 80% market share and high profits. If, now, a second round of
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that people would compete to obtain the property rights to the land.
The resources expended toward obtaining these rights should exactly
equal the value of the land. Thus, the discovery of the land would
be friiitless, yielding no social value at all. In fact, any asset
newly-found or created would be socially useless, with all value
dissipated in attempts to secure rights to it.
An examination of these counter-intuitive implications and their
causes clarifies the problems with the Posner-Tullock formulation.
In the first case, where government does not intervene in the competi-
tive process, a problem arises directly from the assumption that none
of the rent-producing activities has any social value. Just the reverse
is true: it is exactly the social value of these activities that
creates rents. A firm that obtains a monopoly is likely to do so by
outcompeting other firms (i.e., through low prices, better product,
etc.). The result of the existence of monopoly rents has been the
benefit of the consumer and the society at large—the benefit of the
. . 4
competitive process.
The second and third implications illustrate the fundamental
similarity between the Posner-Tullock rectangular loss and the problem
of ill-defined property rights. If in Goldberg's example the current
monopolist had been granted an exclusive, transferable, and irrevocable
right to the monopoly, and if such a right had existed in the first place,
none of the rectangular waste would ever exist. It was the unclear
definition of this right that caused the original competition for
the right. It is the fact that the right is revocable that causes
the expenditure on maintaining the right. To prevent waste, this
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competition ensues with the dominant firm attempting to gain the remaining
20% of the market, the Posner-Tullock analysis would imply that the
competitor and the monopolist, if indeed it becomes that, will have
dissipated all monopoly rents in the quest for monopoly.
A prescription for removing this waste is for the government to
grant a complete monopoly right very early on in this process! This
would remove the waste problem by removing the incentive to dissipate
rent. No one should be allowed to compete for this monopoly, once it
has been granted, on the grounds that such competition would be socially
wasteful. This prescription directly contrasts with that of standard
micro theory, which would suggest that competition should be encouraged
in this industry.
Another implication of treating the income transfer as a social
2
cost is suggested by Goldberg. Goldberg points out that the monopolizing
firm would, according to Posner's logic, expend as much to maintain
its monopoly as it had spent to create that monopoly in the first place.
Thus, a monopoly once created would be costly to get rid of. The waste
created by attempting to remove a monopoly would equal the rectangular
loss created in originally setting up the monopoly. The policy pre-
scription here would seem to be, unless the normal welfare loss triangle
3is very large, to allow the monopoly to continue! There would be a
strong prestimption that industries with controlled competition, such
as trucking, should be maintained in their present state, with no attempt
to remove the barriers to entry.
Let us use the Posner-Tullock framework to determine the
value of a newly discovered piece of land. The analysis would suggest
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new view suggests defining legally-enforceable property rights in
market shares greater than, say, 80%. It is only because the monopoly
rights are often ill-defined that the Posner welfare loss exists.
The problem with the second and third implications arises from
the assximption that the newly created rights are totally communal
(or, as Posner states it, there is a perfectly elastic supply of
inputs into obtaining the monopoly). In fact, most monopoly rights
created are not communal. There are at least some firms with more
ready access to the monopoly right than others. It is precisely
these firms that fight for the creation of the monopoly. The creation
of monopoly where no firm has any advantage is unlikely because of
the lack of gain involved.
III. Social Benefits of Competition for Rent
Any sensible treatment of the welfare effects of monopoly must con-
sider the benefits of rents in inspiring competitive activities.
Especially in markets where entry is not controlled by government means,
it is the competing for monopoly rents that creates competitive activity.
If it could be assured that no such rents could ever exist, much
competitive activity would cease. Competition viewed in this dynamic
context is vastly different from the "competition" of the static
welfare loss model.
This view is not new, but perhaps it could stand some revitaliza-
tion, Joseph Schumpeter, in his classic work on "Creative Destruction"
in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942) pointed out that
"... there is no point in appraising the performance of
that process [of creative destruction] ex visu of a
given point of time; we must judge its performance
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over time, as it unfolds through decades or centuries.
A system—any system, economic or other—that at
every given point of time fully utilizes its possi-
bilities to the best advantage may yet in the long
run be inferior to a system that does so at no given
point of time, because the latter's failure to do so
may be a condition for the level or speed of long-run
performance."
The dynamic force of competition is clear in Schumpeter's work.
The firm, in an effort to obtain higher profits, endeavors to produce
a better product or improve its process of production. The rents this
creates encourage other firms to improve themselves in a similar way.
This process erodes the economic rents, resulting in consequences that
benefit the consimier and society as a whole.
When faced with this view of the competitive process, it becomes
clear that static measures may vastly overstate the cost of monopoly.
Only in a dynamic framework can the cost of monopoly or benefit of monop-
oly properly be measured.
Oliver Williamson (1968) and John S. McGee (1971) have described
the possible social advantage from monopolization most cogently. Al-
though Williamson's discussion focused on the possible social advantages
of merger-induced monopoly, his arguments apply to the wider problem of
the social costs of monopoly. McGee 's presentation was directed toward
the problem here defined.
Assxmie that in the process of competing for monopoly rents, a fiirm
succeeds in lowering its long-run average costs from AC to AC„, as in
o
figure 1. Before the cost-saving was effected, the firm was pricing at
long-run average cost and producing Q units of output. As a resxilt of
its cost-saving, assimie that it gains the power to restrict output to
Q and to raise price to P„.
m I
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The traditional measure of welfare loss due to monopoly counts
the deadweight loss (here shaded and marked ACS) as the social cost
of their monopolization. The crucial point is that the process of
competing for the ability to restrict output may well have productive
efficiency benefits. The cost-savings (here shaded and narked A) must
be deducted from the deadweight loss figure to discover the net effect
on society of this monopolization. If A > ACS, then the net social
cost is negative, i.e., the monopolization benefits society. Resources
saved in the process are so valuable as to offset the reduction in con-
sumer welfare. If A > and A < ACS, there is a net social cost to
monopoly but less than the cost which the traditional measure would
have given. Only when A = 0, that is, when the cost-savings from com-
peting for monopoly rents are non-existent, will the traditional measure
of social cost be accurate.
As the quote from Schumpeter and previous discussion have indicated,
productive efficiency is the essence of competition, and competition is
likely to be most vigorous when the expected monopoly rents are largest.
Thus, there is every reason to believe that cost-savings will result
from attempts to monopolize and that, therefore, the traditional dead-
weight loss exaggerates the social cost of monopoly. This is especially
likely where government does not explicitly grant the monopoly license.
IV. A Model of Competition for Monopoly
Even where there is no social gain from the competition for the
monopoly, the Posner-Tullock rectangle will overstate the welfare loss
if monopoly rights are defined. A simple model of the competition for
the monopoly right makes this point clear. In fact, such a model shows
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that if one firm is much more efficient in obtaining the monopoly than
9
other firms, the amount of the rectangle loss will tend towards zero.
Consider an industry where the government has decided to grant a
monopoly license and prohibit entry. Firms will expend resources to
gain the monopoly. We will investigate what magnitudes of resources
will be expended.
We represent the present value of returns to the license as V. We
suppose there are N potential bidders for the license and index them
by i. We suppose that resources expended by firm i are productive in
increasing the probability that i will be awarded the monopoly. Further-
more, resources expended by firms other than i toward obtaining the
monopoly reduce the probability that i receives the monopoly.
In general form, the probability of firm i's obtaining the monopoly,
T^
.
, can be written
1
TT^ = f^(R)
where R = (R. , ..., R^) is the vector of resources spent by firms 1 through
N on obtaining the monopoly. By the assumptions above,
3f 3f
g^ > and j^ < for j 7^ i.
i J
For illustrative ptarposes we examine a very specific form of the
probability relationship. Here, for each i.
IT
.
=
a.R.
1 i
i N
2 a.R.
i=l J J
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where a is a parameter representing the productivity of firm i's expendi-
tures. Notice that this function satisfies the two conditions above.
Notice also that for any vector R
2 IT. = 1
so the monopoly will be awarded. Futhermore,
—~< 0.
which corresponds to diminishing marginal productivity (in probability terms)
of resources expended on the monopoly.
We shall assume N fixed. The affects of entry will be allowed for
by taking limits as N approaches infinity.
By assuming that firms maximize expected profits, we can solve for
the optimal firm investment in securing the monopoly. Firm i maximizes
E (PROFIT) = TT,V - R.
i 1
^^i
= r^X ^ - ^i
Taking the partial derivative with respect to R and setting it equal to
zero, we obtain
(Za.R.)a. - (R^aja.
-^LJL-1 ^JL^v-l =
(Sa.R.)^
J J
Let T. = Z a.R.. Then
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^i^i 1
2 V
(T. + a.Rj^
1 1 i
and solving for R.,
* ^i ^i\= V^ -^ (1)
i i
Using this result, we can now show that Posner's result obtains in
the special case in which a is the same for each firm and N approaches
infinity (free entry). Without loss of generality, set a. = 1 for
all i, so that
R. = /V E R. - Z R.
" j?^i ^ J5^i J
But, by symmetry R. = R . • Therefore,
R = /VCN - 1)R - (N - 1)R.
and, solving for R.
_
_
V(N - 1 )
i T~
N
The total resources wasted in pursuit of the monopoly, W, will be
W = ER. = NR. = ^ " ^^ V
If N is a very large number, virtually the entire value of the monopoly
will be dissipated. This is the Posner result. His assumption of perfectly
elastic supply of inputs to obtaining the monopoly corresponds to the as-
sumption here that a. is the same for all of a very large number of firms.
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Now suppose that firm 1 has an advantage over all other firms. Suppose
for i > 1, a. = 1, but a^ > 1. In this case, by symmetry
R. = R^ for all i, j 5* 1
Hence,
T^ = (N - 1)R^ for i ?t 1,
and T^ = (N - 2)R^ + a^R^ for any i ?^ 1
From condition (1) above, we obtain
"^1 "^ °A " "^VCN - DR^a^ C2)
Hence, since
TjL + R^ = T^ + a^R^ = /VCN - l)R^a^
from (1)
/V[(N - 2)R + a R^] = /V(N - l)R.a
(N - 2)R^ -fa^R^ = (N - DR^a^
^i " ^ (N - l)a^ - (N - 2) ^^^
Substituting back into (2) above and solving for R
,
gives
R, =
1
^o a. N N - 2 , N - 1
And as N gets large,
1^ N - 1 (N - l)a^ - (N - 2)
11
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1 <°1 - ^)
lim R = V
a^-1
and thus 11m a. R, = —^ V
1 1 a.
From (3),
and thus
Nx- 1 ^ -1
(N - DRj^Oj^
^^
^^^i = (N - Da^^ - (N - 2)
a - 1
lim (N - 1)R. = — V ^j^ i a^ a^^ - 1 a^
Hence, the total waste
, as N gets large, becomes
lim w = lim (N - 1)R + lim R.
V °1 " ' 2 1
Nx» 1 a^ '•
'"l
It is easy to see, from condition (4), that the amount wasted will
depend on the size of a —i.e., on how much more productive firm I's ex-
penditures toward capturing the monopoly are. If firm 1 is slightly more
efficient, a is not much bigger than one, and almost the whole value of
the monopoly is wasted (W - V) . As a gets very large, however, waste goes
dW^
to zero. Since -;— < and at a, = 1, W = V, the loss will never beda 1 '
greater than V but may be much less.
Thus, Posner's argument that the entire monopoly rent will be wasted
represents an overestimate of the waste. If any firm has any compara-
tive advantage in securing the monopoly, the welfare loss will be smaller
than Posner suggests. The larger this advantage, the smaller the waste.
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If one firm has a large advantage in getting the monopoly license (e.g.,
the chief executive is brother-in-law of the mayor) , the waste is likely
1 2
to be very small." It is the last case that will be the usual case
of monopoly creation, since only here is the lobbying to have a monopoly
13
created going to be worth the effort.
V, Conclusion
We have seen that there is little theoretical reason to adopt
strictly the Tullock-Posner model of the social costs of monopoly.
Their contention that the income transfer from consumers to the monop-
olist encourages inefficiencies and should therefore figure as part of
the social cost, gives rise to curious public policy conclusions, e.g.,
that the state should enforce a property right in monopoly so as to
discourage wasteful competition.
We have further shown that thes'e curious implications are the
result of a failure to distinguish between two different types of mono-
poly. When a monopoly is secured without assistance from the state,
the possibility of earning monopoly rents has socially valuable byprod-
ucts in spurring competitive activity such as costsaving innovations
and improved products. For the case where the competition for monopoly
ends with a monopoly license is guaranteed by the state, we have devel-
oped a model which shows the welfare rectangle loss of monopoly to be
a special—and unlikely—case of a more general system of competition.
That is, as long as there are differences among firms in the productivity
of resources expended on monopoly acquisition, then not all of the in-
come transfer to the monopolist may be counted a social cost. Since
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it seems perfectly reasonable that those productivities will differ,
Posner's and Tullock's assertion becomes a special case.
There is no doubt of the value of the Posner-Tullock model in
drawing our attention to the social effects of competition for monopoly.
Our finding is that in the majority of cases there will not be significant
waste in the competitive process. Indeed, where the competition for
monopoly occurs in a free market, there is every reason to expect social
benefits.
M/D/228
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Footnotes
The social costs of the monopoly would include not only the
deadweight loss in consumer surplus but the value of the resources used
up in securing (and then maintaining) the monopoly,
victor Goldberg, "Reflections on the Welfare Loss Rectangle,"
Industrial Organization Review , 4 0-976)
.
3
This assumes that the current monopolist had not anticipated
any challenge to its monopoly position when first competing for the
monopoly, and that the attack on this monopoly does not affect beliefs
about future attacks on the monopoly or attacks on any other monopoly.
If these assimiptions are false, other policy prescriptions may be
called for.
4
See Harold Demsetz, "Economics as a Guide to Antitrust
Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics , xix (August, 1976).
This is before any expenditures on obtaining the monopoly.
Since all people and firms have unique efficiencies and skills which
produce rents, it is unclear why such differentials can not exist
in securing monopolies.
George J. Stigler, "Theory of Regulation," Bell Journal of
Economics
, 2 (Spring, 1971).
Paul J. McNulty, "Economic Theory and the Meaning of Competi-
tion ," The_2uarterl2_jJou2ia2^_of_Jconomi^ 82 (1968).
g
Note that Posner specifically excludes this possibility in his assump-
tions.
9An additional point in the Posner-Tullock framework bears
mentioning. Posner notes that bribes (of, say, government officials)
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to obtain or maintain a monopoly turn into social cost in that they
spur excess competition to become the payee (official). However, the
official's salary may be lower than what it otherwise would have been
without any excess competition being created. If that is the case,
the rents to being a bribable official are reaped by the public-at-
large, with no excess "moving into the area," since the monopoly
presumably netted a reduction in welfare. For an estimate of social
costs, in competition for government favor, see Kreuger (1974).
Friedman (1980) offers an interesting theoretical treatment of these
issues.
Note that the second order condition is satisfied. Also note that
the equilibrium concept used here is one of Nash equilibriums with
strategy represented by R. , The equilibrium concept is almost irrelevant
to the conclusions, however, and is used primarily for illustrative
purposes.
This assumption shows the largest possible welfare loss.
12
This has only been shown here for a very specific model of the
probability of getting a license; it will be true in general that any
advantage will result in some unwasted rent, and a decisive advantage
(Tr.=l) will result in no waste. These results are again independent
of the equilibrium concept used, as long as firms are not systematically
overoptimistic about obtaining the monopoly.
13
There will be some resources expended in lobbying, of course.
But there is no guarantee that these will waste all rents.
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Notes
We required the firms to be listed during the entire sample
period. The Center for Security Price Research (CESP) monthly tape
was used to select NYSE listed firms. A firm was considered listed
if it had monthly stock returns available for the entire sample period.
2
The absolute percentage error is computed as the average of
Actual EPS - Predicted EPS
Since this error metric can be explosive
Actual EPS
when the denominator approaches zero we truncated errors in excess of
ten to a value of ten. This operation was done for a very small percent-
age of the cases.




